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Key Points
Mine investors generally have little

1	
   incentive to construct assets with

greater capacity than their mine’s
production.
Even where regulations mandate

2	
   shared use, governments faced with
monopolistic structures rarely have
the bargaining power, and seldom is
there an efficient statutory access
regime to regulate the monopolies.
To create a structural barrier to

3	
   monopolistic behavior governments

can either separate ownership of
mine, rail and port assets; or consider
a government’s golden share.
To maximize throughput and

4	
   economic efficiency, governments
can develop an effective
coordination mechanism and
require a double-track system.
Governments should apply shared –

5	
   used regulations that ensure

financially sustainable models while
requiring the mine- owner to design
or build infrastructure with excess
capacity.
There is a need for carefully drafted

6	
   legal provisions mandating shared

use, which are precise, based on
objective criteria and simple to
adjudicate, with a clear legal remedy
for their breach, and access to a
forum for resolving disputes.
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Introduction: Rationale, Key Definitions and Preliminary Findings
Rationale
The core of this research agenda relates to finding ways to leverage extractiveindustry-related infrastructure investments in developing countries for the broader
benefit of the national and regional community. According to the Africa Infrastructure
Country Diagnostic conducted by the World Bank, Africa faces an annual infrastructure
funding gap of US$31 billion; leveraging extractive-industry-related investment could
help fill this gap. The World Bank estimates that African investment needs in
infrastructure would cost US$93 billion per year, half of which is for the power sector,
followed by water and transport.1 The current level of spending is US$62 billion; the
highest sector spending is in transport, followed by telecommunications and energy.2
To be beneficial for a country’s development, non-renewable resource extraction needs
to be leveraged to build long-term assets, such as infrastructure, that will support
sustainable and inclusive growth. It can be for instance by capitalizing on the resource
taxation potential and reinvesting the tax revenues in all-weather roads but it can also
be by requiring shared use of the resource infrastructure.
However, natural resource concessionaires have traditionally adopted an enclave
approach to infrastructure development, providing their own power and transportation
services to ensure that the basic infrastructure needed for their operations is reliably
available.3 Hence, large investments in physical infrastructure are often uncoordinated
with national infrastructure development plans. The country therefore misses the
opportunity to promote shared use of the infrastructure and to take advantage of
potential synergies. Shared use with both mineral and non-mineral users (such as
agriculture and forestry) should be beneficial for Africa: with the former for reasons of
scale economies and with the latter for reasons related to diminishing the cost of
transportation on long haul that right now impedes the potential of the cost-sensitive
commercial agriculture.
As the World Bank’s report on Liberia states: “the interface with national infrastructure
planning is not well developed (…) the contracts do not give the sense of the
concessionaires operating within or accommodating themselves to a pre-existing
national plan.”4
If companies and Governments consider the potential shared use through expansion of
the private sector’s planned investments at the design phase, then the incremental
capital cost on the economy and environment could be minimized while the impact on
sustainable development is optimized. This requires investigation of regulatory,
1

C. Briceño-Garmendia, K. Smits, V. Foster, “Financing Public Infrastructure in Sub-Saharan Africa: Patterns, Issues,
and Options,” Africa Infrastructure Sector Diagnostic Background Paper No. 15 (Washington D.C.: The World Bank,
2008)
2
V. Foster, C. Briceño-Garmendia, eds., Africa’s Infrastructure: A Time for Transformation (Washington, D.C.: The
World Bank, 2010)
3
See H. Singer, “The distribution of gains from trade and investment—revisited,” 11(4) Journal of Development
Studies 376 (1975), pp. 376–382.
4
World Bank, “Leveraging investments by natural resource concessionaires,” Infrastructure Policy Notes, World Bank
for the Republic of Liberia (Washington D.C.: The World Bank, 2011)
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commercial and operating models that facilitate wider use of mining investments beyond
the needs of the mine operator for the broader benefit of the country.
The potential of leveraging infrastructure investments in extractive industries for national
and regional development is gaining prominence among policymakers. The World Bank,
the African Development Bank and the African Union, along with various other
development agencies, have endorsed the concept, recognizing that private sector
involvement is required to meet the vast infrastructure funding gap in developing
countries.5
This Policy Paper aims to develop an economically, legally and operationally rational
framework to enable shared use of resource-based infrastructure, which is critical for
the integration and diversification of the economy.
Basic situation and definitions
Our starting point is a new mine development which requires new or upgraded rail
and/or port infrastructure to reach export markets. While the need to leverage
infrastructure investments applies to all types of assets (road, railways, ports,
telecommunications, energy, waste water treatment facilities), this Policy Paper only
covers rail and ports. Key terms are defined as follows:
Infrastructure assets: the physical railway and/or port connecting the mine to the coastal
loading point for export.
Infrastructure services: the rail freight carriage and/or ship loading/unloading using the
infrastructure assets.
Mine investor: the party wishing to make the new mine development.
Shared use: the provision of infrastructure services to both the mining investor and
other parties. These other parties can be either mineral users or non- mineral users.
Third party access: the provision of infrastructure services by a party other than the
owner of the infrastructure asset.6
Research Questions
This Policy Paper focuses on the following question: Which regulatory and commercial
models best enable shared use?
-‐ What are the main barriers currently hindering shared use?
-‐ To what extent can these barriers be addressed through regulation?
o What are the types of access regimes available?
o Should the infrastructure assets be owned by a separate entity to the mine
investor?
5

See M. Farooki, “The infrastructure and commodities interface in Africa: Time for cautious optimism?,” 24 Journal of
International Development (2012), p. 216.
6
The user of the services being then either the services provider or a customer of the services provider.
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-‐

o Would Government ownership of the infrastructure assets best preserve
shared use/third party access?
o What mechanism can be set to coordinate shared use among parties to
maximize throughput when the mine owner does not own the entire railport logistic chain?
o What legal requirements should apply to the owner of the infrastructure
assets?
What are the incentives to ensure that infrastructure assets are designed to
sufficient capacity for public use or use by other mineral users?

Later research will seek to extend the analysis to other forms of infrastructure as well as
to answer other operational implications of shared use, such as:
(1) What is the trade-off between maximizing operational efficiency of the mine investor
and facilitating shared use?
-‐ What is the loss in efficiencies due to shared use? Due to third party access?
-‐ How to solve the operational complexity of having mixed use of minerals and nonminerals on the same line?
-‐ To what extent does the primary owner need to be compensated for loss of
efficiency where shared use or third party access is mandated?
-‐ What should be the commercial terms for shared use?
-‐ Who is responsible for providing compensation? What form should it take (higher
access charges, Government subsidies)?
(2) Special case of land-locked countries: how can land-locked countries ensure shared
use in neighboring-country ports? What commercial terms for their commodities can
they require?
Preliminary findings
Freight mode choice for mineral commodities
The transportation mode for commodities follows standard transport economics, where
the value of what is being transported is related to the transport costs of the mode
being used. Commodities strictly carried by rail have the lowest value per ton, while
those carried by trucks tend to have a higher value.7 For instance in 2002, freight
carried by truck in the US was about 4 times more valuable than the freight carried by
rail. 8
The following table analyzes the total world production quantity and the value per unit of
selected mineral commodities in the US, with the commodities listed in order of average
price per unit, lowest to highest. We can see that on one hand, there are minerals like
manganese, phosphate rock, coal or iron ore that are bulky and low-value commodities
that are relatively well suited to be transported by rail, while on the other hand,
commodities like gold or platinum are much higher in terms of value and not bulky.

7

J-P Rodrigue, "The Geography of Transport Systems," Third Edition, (New York: Routledge, 2013), available at:
http://people.hofstra.edu/geotrans/eng/ch3en/conc3en/valuetonusshipments.html
8
U.S. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Transportation Statistics, based on data from the preliminary 2002
Commodity Flow Survey data, January 2004.
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World
Production
(2010)9

Average price
per unit (2010, in
dollars)10
8
27
50

1 metric ton

13,000,000
211,000,000
176,000,000
2,400,000,00
0
7,243,779,43
011

16512

1 metric ton
1 metric ton
1 metric ton
1 metric ton
1 metric ton

22,000,000
1,100,000
4,100,000
16,200,000
88,000

230
667
2,337
7,694
46,297

1 metric ton
1 metric ton
1 metric ton

11
2,500
183

1,050,000
38,580,896
51,441,195

Mineral

Unit

Manganese (gross
weight)
Bauxite, Alumina
Phosphate Rock

1 metric ton
1 metric ton
1 metric ton

Iron Ore (usable)

1 metric ton

Coal
Chromium (gross
weight)
Graphite (crude)
Lead (contained)
Copper (contained)
Cobalt (contained)
Diamond (natural
industrial)
Gold (contained)
Platinum

90

It is worth noting that a modern railcar has a gross capacity of about 125.5 tons in trains
of 100 cars or more, resulting in a total carrying capacity of about 12,500 tons. An old
train dating back to the 1950s, often still used in Africa, has a carrying capacity of 4,440
tons13. Based on these numbers and those of the table above, it appears that few
commodities will generate enough demand for a single mine to afford and build railways
dedicated to its own products. Although the table above does not present the bulk
density of commodities, this is also another factor in commodity transport decisions14.

9

2010 world production figures for all commodities except coal, generally based on Platts Metal Week North
American prices, see source for more pricing details, from U.S. Geological Survey, Mineral Commodities Summaries,
annual, January 2011, available at: http://minerals.er.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/mcs/
10
2010 average price per unit figures for all commodities except coal from U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of
the United States: 2012, Table 905, available at: http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2012/tables/12s0905.pdf
11
“Total Primary Coal Production” from U.S. Energy Information Administration, “International Energy Statistics,”
available at:
http://www.eia.gov/cfapps/ipdbproject/iedindex3.cfm?tid=1&pid=7&aid=1&cid=regions&syid=2010&eyid=2010&unit=T
ST
12
Coal price information from “Global coking coal prices to rise sharply,” available at:
http://www.constructionweekonline.in/article-6329-global_coking_coal_prices_to_rise_sharply_crisil/
13
Qorum Corporation, “Railway Capacity Background & Overview,” (2005), available at:
http://www.quorumcorp.net/Downloads/Papers/RailwayCapacityOverview.pdf
14
Copper, for instance, takes on varying values of bulk density, depending on how the commodity has been handled.
Copper concentrate, with about 25-35% copper along with various sulfides of copper and iron, has been shown to
have a bulk density of about 35 (pounds per cubic foot). However, copper fines that have undergone a refining
process, have a bulk density of about 101 (pounds per cubic foot) see for instance “Bulk Density and Gravity Chart,”
available at: http://www.asiinstr.com/technical/Material_Bulk_Density_Chart_C.htm . The significant increase in bulk
density after refining may make it reasonable to use rail transport later in the copper production process, whereas it
may not have made sense in the earlier stages of mining and smelting.
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Iron-ore and coal mines are typically the mines for which the challenges of shared use
presented in this Policy Paper are the most applicable. The mines targeted by this
Policy Paper are also far from the export point, since in addition to value, volume, or
density, distance is another prominent factor in commodity transport decisions. Trucks
are predominantly used for short trips. Also, some commodities have time constraints or
service guarantees; for these commodities, trucks are typically preferred over rail due to
speed, flexibility, and reliability.15
Key barriers to achieving shared use
Desktop research of mineral railways and port systems around the world shows the
existence of several common barriers that hinder the incidence of shared use models in
practice:
1. Monopolistic behavior by infrastructure owners who perceive shared use as a
competitive threat;
2. Operating efficiency tends to decrease with more users on the system due to
high coordination costs; hence, mine owners are reluctant to allow shared use.
The case is worsened when railways are single-track;
3. Non-mineral users tend to be crowded out by mineral users, given that mineral
carriage tends to be the most profitable use of the line as it is high volume but
concentrated in a couple of mines. By contrast, non-mineral users are generally
low volume and dispersed, making shared use uneconomic;
4. Mine investors generally have little incentive to construct assets with greater
capacity than their mine’s production;
5. Even where regulations mandate shared use or third party access, Governments
faced with monopolistic structures rarely have the bargaining power or the
willingness to impose such terms, and seldom is there an efficient statutory
access regime to refer to to regulate the monopolies;
6. Finally, weakly drafted contractual language between states and private investors
has proved ineffective in ensuring shared use or third party access, particularly
when the designated infrastructure such as railways is capacity constrained.
Key recommendations to promote shared use
To promote effective shared use, each of the barriers described above must be
mitigated to the extent possible. Our analysis of case studies covering mineral railways
and ports in the United States, Australia, Africa (South Africa, Zambia, Burkina Faso,
Cameroon, Ivory Coast, Guinea, and Madagascar), Brazil and India suggests the
following recommendations:
1. Create a structural barrier to monopolistic behavior by a) either separating
ownership of mine, rail and port assets; or b) considering a Government’s golden
share in the project when Government’s monitoring mechanisms are efficient;
2. To maximize throughput and economic efficiency along the supply chain, a)
develop an effective coordination mechanism in a non-fully integrated situation,
b) require a double-track system in all situations;
15

“Analysis of Freight Movement Mode Choice Factors,” The Center for Urban Transportation Research at the
University of South Florida, p.8, available at:
http://www.dot.state.fl.us/rail/Publications/Studies/Planning/ModeChoiceFactors.pdf.
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3. Apply regulation related to shared use so as to ensure financially sustainable
models: freedom to set tariffs, a last resort arbitration mechanism, take or pay
contracts; and specifically to shared use with general cargo :subsidies, crosssubsidization and open-access service roads;
4. Require the mine owner to build infrastructure with excess capacity, and consider
various financing options for this excess capacity;
5. Carefully draft legal provisions mandating shared use which are clear, precise,
based on objective criteria and simple to adjudicate, with a clear legal remedy for
their breach, and access to a forum for resolving disputes.
We will now consider each of these recommendations in turn. Some of these
recommendations can be mutually exclusive (such as #1 and #4) and therefore
constitute different alternative solutions to the problem.
Recommendation One: Create a structural barrier to monopolistic behavior by a)
either separating ownership of mine, rail and port assets; or b) consider a
Government’s golden share in the project when Government’s monitoring
mechanisms are efficient
Any railway-port system exhibits natural monopoly features: constructing the asset
involves high fixed costs, which are usually sunk, while there are relatively low operating
costs. As a result, the marginal cost is much below the average cost and both decline
as output expands. 16 It causes a problematic economic situation where prices cannot
be set at the marginal cost as required by social efficiency because “for an activity to be
commercially viable, prices must be at least equal to the average cost.” 17 In this
situation, introducing competition will be wasteful if duplicative facilities are constructed
and the lowest possible average cost18 cannot be achieved. In other words, it is
generally most efficient for one firm to supply all of the market’s demand.
Under such circumstances, however, a policy of awarding a monopoly concession in
order to minimize costs may result in exclusive access or monopoly pricing for railway
and port infrastructure services, especially if the concession is awarded to a mining
company. Indeed, mines use rail and ports as part of an integrated mine-rail-port
production system which is a source of great competitive advantage; allowing shared
use of the rail or port assets is seen by the mine investor as providing an advantage to
potential competitors, in addition to generating high coordinating costs.
The reluctance of mine investors who also own rail and port infrastructure to allow
shared use has clearly been visible in the Pilbara iron ore region of Western Australia
(see Box 1).

16

Higher costs will result if more than one producer supplies the market, as each producer will have to spread its
fixed costs over smaller output volumes.
17
P. Collier, “Building an African infrastructure,” 48 (4) Finance & Development (2011), available at:
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2011/12/collier.htm
18
In the case of monopolies, the average cost is already above the marginal cost and only the marginal cost is
socially efficient (affordable by a maximum of users).
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Box 1: The Pilbara iron ore region: monopoly effects on competition
The Pilbara region has immense iron ore deposits, but they are located at some
distance from the sea, and constructing a new railway and port facility is a massive
capital undertaking. This capital cost is a large barrier for potential new entrants. For
this reason, the two companies (BHP Billiton and Rio Tinto) that separately own the
existing rail /port lines have dominated the industry. Indeed, the only way junior miners
had been able to obtain access to the railways and ports controlled by BHP Billiton or
Rio Tinto in the past had been by selling part of the project to those companies in
exchange for use of their rail.19
This duopoly was challenged in court in the early 2000s when Fortescue Metals Group
(FMG) sought to enter the market, having acquired large, attractive mining leases in the
region. In 2004, FMG requested access by filing a complaint before the Australian
Competition Tribunal under the Trade Practices Act of 1974 (now replaced by the
Competition and Consumer Act of 2010). The Australian Competition Tribunal refused.
The case has been appealed and a final decision is expected by next year. In other
terms, FMG’s third party rail access claims have been largely unsuccessful, despite the
existence of State and Federal laws promoting third party access. BHP Billiton and Rio
Tinto strongly resisted open access. Although they primarily cited operational efficiency
grounds that the Tribunal concurred with (the Tribunal explained that access would
induce the owner to incur significant costs, including logistical and commercial
constraints, constraints on expansion plans and delays due to the change in operating
practices, all of which would lead to lost export revenues for the nation20), the desire to
prevent competitors from entering the market was also a potential factor.21 Ultimately,
FMG had to build its own railway and port infrastructure at a cost of US$ 2.5 billion to
develop its mine deposits. Interestingly, FMG did so under an open access regime, but
charging very high access fees.22
(1) Consider separating ownership
Separating ownership of the mine, railway and port infrastructure is a strong structural
solution to combat potential monopolistic behavior by infrastructure owners that hinders
shared use. In short, if the owner of the infrastructure assets is different from the mine

19

M. Fagan, “Introducing competition into natural monopoly industries: an evaluation of mandated access to
Australian freight railroads,” Regulatory Policy Program Working Paper (Cambridge, MA: Mossavar-Rahmani Center
for Business and Government, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 2007)
20
In the Matter of Fortescue Metals Group Limited [2010], June 30, 2010, available at:
http://www.ncc.gov.au/images/uploads/DERaFoTD-001.pdf
21
See, e.g., National Competition Council, “Application for declaration of a service provided by the Mt Newman
railway line under section 44F(1) of the Trade Practice Act of 1974: final recommendation,” where the Council found
that monopoly access to rail lines in the Pilbara by BHP Billiton and Rio Tinto limited competition for development of
new iron ore tenements, giving those companies incentives to exercise market power to keep prices “artificially low”
(at paragraphs 7.184-7.210) (March 2006)
22
In the Matter of Fortescue Metals Group Limited [2010], June 30, 2010, available at:
http://www.ncc.gov.au/images/uploads/DERaFoTD-001.pdf. See also Peter Ker, “New Rail Line Plan for Pilbara”, The
Age, April 26, 2012, available at: http://www.theage.com.au/business/new-rail-line-plan-for-pilbara-201204251xlho.html?skin=text-only; and A. Burrell, “Iron Ore Junior Breaks Stranglehold with ‘historic’ deal,” The Australian
(February 25, 2011), available at: http://www.theaustralian.com.au/business/mining-energy/iron-ore-junior-breaksstranglehold-with-historic-deal/story-e6frg9df-1226011619901
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investor, the owner is incentivized to maximize traffic, (provided that there is sufficient
capacity), which should naturally result in shared use.23
To achieve this, the Government could prohibit mine investors from controlling
ownership of the infrastructure assets (i.e. the rail network or the principal port). Instead,
the infrastructure assets would be owned by separate entities, either Governmentowned or private, which deal with the mine owners on an arms-length, contractual
basis. Infrastructure services could either be provided by the infrastructure asset owners
(under a “common-carrier” model)24, or by the mine investors themselves under a third
party access regime.
Separating the ownership is particularly necessary in the cases in which:
1) the Government is faced temporarily with one mining investor in a promising rich
mining area that is bound to attract many other miners (example of Liberia with
Arcelor Mittal);
2) the Government is faced with major companies that can afford the total infrastructure
costs, that do not see a business case for sharing the upfront capital costs
(example of Mozambique with Vale, Australia with BHP and Rio Tinto).
Observed infrastructure asset ownership structures
There are a number of different ownership models in operation around the world, from
fully integrated systems where the mine investor owns the entire mine/rail/port system
(as in Pilbara), to fully separated systems, where separate entities own the mine, rail
and port.
The following table indicates the ownership structure observed in various case studies.
The letter code indicates the owners/operators of each particular asset; if a letter is
repeated, it means same entity, a different letter means a different entity:
System

Description
of model

Mine
owner

Rail
owner

Port owner

A

Rail
operato
r
A

West
Australia iron
ore (Pilbara)

Fully
integrated

A
Private

Private

Private

Private

Hunter Valley
coal
(NSW,
Australia)

Partially
integrated
(mine/port)

A

B

C

A
(consortiu
m
of
certain
miners
and
customers

A

Port
operat
or
A

Shared
use
realized?
No

Privat
e
A

Yes

23

Theoretically, the same effect could be achieved under common ownership but separated operational
management. For example, a single company may both own the mine and the rail, but by clearly separating the two
functions internally, the rolling stock operations operate at arms-length from the below-rail infrastructure division, on
equal commercial footing with competing rolling stock operators. In the European Union, for example, no separate
ownership is required from the rail and train owners but member states have to require at least the separate
accounting and operation of railway infrastructure, See E.U. Directive 91/440/EEC on the development of the
Community’s railways, 95/18/EC on the licensing of railway undertakings, 95/19/EC on the allocation of railway
infrastructure capacity and the charging of infrastructure fees.
24
See recommendation 3 for a discussion on this model
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)

Richards Bay
(South Africa)

Gov.

Private

Private

A

B

B

Private

Gov.

Gov.

Privat
e
A

Queensland
coal

Fully
separated

A

B

C

A(coal
terminal)
B (general
freight)
Private
(coal)
Gov.(gene
ral freight)
D

Private

Private

Private

Private

SETRAG
(Gabon)

Partially
integrated
(mine/rail)

A

B

A

B

Private

Gov.

Private

Gov.

Zambia
Railways
(Zambia)

Fully
separated

A

B

C

B

Privat
e
B

Private

Gov.

Private

Gov.

Gov.

Mbalam
Railway
(Cameroon)

Fully
integrated

A

A

A

A

A

Private

Private

Private

Private

Privat
e

Simfer
SPV
(Guinea)

Partially
integrated
(mine/rail/
port)

A

A/B

A/B

A/B

A/B

Yes
in
theory
upon
strong
commitme
nt of the
25
company
Yes

Private

Private/
Gov.

Private/
Gov.

Private/Go
v.

Partially
integrated
(mine
and
rail and port
operations)
Partially
integrated
( mine and
port
operations)
Fully
integrated
(mine/rail/
port)

A

B

A

B

Privat
e/Gov
.
A

Yes

Private

Gov.

Private

Gov.

Privat
e

A

NA

A/B

A

Private/Go
v.

Privat
e

A (in
consortiu
m)
Private

A

MarampaPepel (Sierra
Leone)
Fort Dauphin
(Madagascar)

Vitoria-Minas
Railway
(Brazil)

Partially
integrated
(mine/port)

Private

26

Private
A

A

A

Private

Private

Private

Privat
e
E
Privat
e
C

With
general
freight
only – the
only users
are the
mine
owners
Yes

No
but
required
by
the
contract
Yes

Yes

Yes

27

Privat
e

25

See Box 14. This is the situation of a fully integrated system whereby the mine owner sees a business case in
sharing its logistic chain.
26
A/B designates two different types of owners and is characteristic of a joint-venture ownership in this table.
27
In Brazil, although the same owner controls mine, rail and port (Vale), it is also required by regulation to allow other
users to access the railway, so it also carries non-Vale traffic (see Box 2).
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Krishnapatnam
Railway
Company
Limited (India)

Partially
integrated
under
Government
ownership

A&B&
28
C
Private
/ Gov./

A

A/B/D

D

D

Gov.

Private/
Gov.

Gov.

Privat
e

Yes

As can be seen, a number of countries have opted for partially integrated models that
allow some (but not complete) consolidation of ownership. These systems have a mixed
record of achieving shared use in practice.
-‐ For example, in Richards Bay (South Africa), while the railway is Government
owned (Transnet), the coal terminal at the port is owned by the major coal mine
investors, and it is therefore difficult for other coal producers to obtain capacity
allocations at the port. Consequently, those other coal producers do not seek
access to the railways, so shared access is not achieved in practice. By contrast,
in the Hunter Valley coal chain (Australia), a consortium mainly consisting of
mining companies owns the coal terminal at the port, but Government regulation
obliges it to make capacity available for other users (see Box 8), and shared use
is achieved in practice.
-‐ In Africa, the partially integrated model where the mine owner has been granted
the vertically integrated concession of the railways (and thus is responsible for all
the capital expenditure as well as the operations and maintenance of the assets)
has not been successful either in achieving shared use. This type of vertically
integrated concession29 where the state keeps the ownership of the infrastructure
assets has generally not allowed the preservation of “national interest30” as the
concession arrangements generally claim. Indeed when 1) investors are both
shippers and rail service operators while incurring the main capital costs and 2)
this conflict of interest has not been thoroughly addressed in transaction
design31, the after-the-fact regulatory efforts are doomed to failure, even in
countries with strong institutional settings (see Australia’s case study, Box 6 and
Box 19). Therefore keeping the ownership of the tracks32 in Africa hasn’t been a
salutary option. By contrast, designing a golden share provision as in Brazil (see
section below) or keeping a strong equity stake in the project when the
government can afford it as in Guinea or in India (see Box 17 and Box 16
respectively) are more promising solutions in situation of partially/fully integrated
model.
As stated above, the safer solution is separated ownership and in particular having a
“third party commercial operator with core competence in infrastructure but without
mining interests.”33 It has been the case in the copper belt in Zambia with the company
28

A/B/D also designates a joint-venture arrangement; A&B&C designates 3 different owners of mines.
The case of Mbalam in Cameroon is an exception to the traditional African arrangements: this is a greenfield
project, and the ownership of the infrastructure assets has been given to the mining company. (see Box 14)
30
In this situation the term “national interest” is used as opposed to “monopoly power.”
31
See Recommendation 5, related to the need for specific and efficient legal language.
32
In the case of Sitarail (Abidjan-Ouagadougou railway concessionaire), the first private railway concession in West
Africa, the concession was established under an affermage structure as a means to better preserve the national
interest against the risk of monopoly by the concessionaire. The Government is also the owner of the existing rolling
stock (in addition to the infrastructure) and is responsible for the maintenance, which is financed by the
concessionaire through annual payments, and for raising the required finance for the investment program for new
rolling stocks. The cost of serving debt finance is borne by Sitarail in exchange for the ownership of the new rolling
stock.
33
Collier, “Building an African infrastructure,” (2011), op. cit.
29
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Railway Systems of Zambia34 and now with the reinstatement of the Zambian North
West Rail Company (NWR). With the recent outpouring of FDI in the minerals of the
Zambian North Western region, a new 405km railway line linking this region to the rest
of Zambia has been designed with the financial support of an expert in supply chain
optimization, the US Tagos Group, and to be operated by NWR.35
(2) Consider the golden share as a monopoly power limitation:
Brazil has taken a different approach from the African concession structure to preserve
the national interest: it consolidated ownership of rail and port infrastructure assets in
the mining company Vale, but when Vale was privatized in the 1990s, the Government
retained twelve golden shares which allow it to influence key strategic decisions (see
Box 2).
A “golden share” is a nominal share conferring special voting rights that are established
by law. A golden share is typically a single share granting its owner up to the minimum
amount of shares of voting rights necessary for a shareholder to block board decisions.
Golden shares are generally only used in “strategic industries”, for public interest
reasons. Possible rights (“special powers”) attached to a golden share are detailed in
the articles of incorporation of the companies. They can range from a limited veto right
to a right to consent to everyday management decisions and can vary in the breadth of
their scope, in their duration, and in the manner by which state powers are exercised.
The golden share allows the state to benefit from a controlling or majority interest
despite very little investment in the company. The state also has the flexibility to define
the rights that it will be granted with such golden share, depending on the state’s needs.
For example, the Indian Government has recently decided to adopt this device to keep
control over its railway despite privatization, taking a golden share in the railway
management company SPV L&T Metro Rail Hyderabad.36
Similarly, the Government of Argentina retained one golden share in the railway
company Belgrano Cargas after awarding the railway concession.37 The golden share
gives the Government of Argentina the right to elect one director who has a decisive say
in the decisions of the company regarding the types of services offered and the fixing of
trip fares. The golden share has allowed the Government of Argentina to ensure that the
railway keeps long-distance passenger services as well as commuter rail services,
which had been abandoned for a number of years prior to the concessioning.

34

Unfortunately this company has underperformed.
As said above, the copper belt is however an easier case than coal, iron ore and manganese corridor where those
very high volume commodities generate the need for high capacity dedicated lines that miners can easily afford as
opposed to copper mine owners.
36
In exchange for the golden share, the Government is entitled power to veto, purchase the company’s own shares,
or reduce the company’s share capital among others. See V. Rishi Kumar, “L&T Metro Rail hands over ‘Golden
Share’ to Andhra Pradesh Govt,” The Hindu Business Line, February 11, 2012, available at:
http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/companies/article2882253.ece.
37
Republic of Argentina, Decree Law 1037/99 approving the concession contract between the Ministry of Economy,
Public Works and Public Service and the company Belgrano Cargas S.A..
35
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The golden share can be an efficient policy tool, depending on the scope of rights that it
provides to its holder and on the specificity of the goals that it seeks to achieve, e.g. the
provision of passenger services or general cargo on reasonable terms, open access to
other private operators on a non-discriminatory basis, or the creation of a tool for
company monitoring.38
Box 2: Golden share in Vale Brazil
After being privatized in 1997, Vale decided to focus exclusively on the mining business.
However, the company kept several strategic assets in the energy and logistics sectors
that it previously held, primarily to reduce the costs and the risks of the company's
mining operations. Therefore, Vale still owns both the Vitória-Minas railway and several
terminals of Tubarão Port Complex as parts of its integrated production model, and it
was granted in 1997 the concession to operate and develop the railway for 30 years.
While privatizing Vale, the state retained control through special class preferred shares
(the “golden shares”) and a combination of ordinary and preferential shares. State
pension funds have a majority interest in Valepar which holds a majority of the voting
shares in Vale. This control has been used to ensure that Vale keeps its lines open
access. For instance, major contracts have been signed between Vale and Gerdau
Açominas, Belgo Siderurgia, Usiminas or Cenibra to transport mostly iron ore (80%),
other mining and steel products (pellets, pig iron, steel products), but also coal and coke
(import), and round wood, cellulose, limestone, agricultural products, containers and
vehicles. However, given the production capacity of Vale relatively to the limited line
capacity , the railway is mainly used to carry ore extracted from Vale’s own mines (80%
of the annual freight volume), while only 20% is related to third parties’ activities (300
different clients in total39). Vale also operates rail passenger service on this line (1
million passengers annually).40
The golden share is however not an efficient mechanism if Government’s monitoring
mechanisms are deficient or limited by information asymmetry. For instance, in
Malaysia, the Government failed to effectively use its golden share to control market
entry and supervise tariffs in the railway, airways and telecommunications sectors
because of information asymmetry between the state and the operator.41

38

This device, for example, would also allow parties to overcome situations where the concessionaire refuses
monitoring, such as in the case of Zambia Railways. In this case where the Government of Zambia doesn’t have any
golden share., the concession agreements stipulated that the concessionaire, Railway Systems of Zambia (RSZ),
would submit quarterly reports to Zambia Railways Limited, the Government asset manager but RSZ has submitted
no legal reporting and the Government of Zambia is currently seeking ways, so far in vain, to cancel the concession.
See Trademark Southern Africa, “Aid-for-Trade case story: Revamping the regional railway systems in Eastern and
Southern Africa” (WTO/OECD, 2011), available at: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/27/63/47407233.pdf
See also “Cancel concession Zambia Railways,” Lusaka Times, February 6, 2012, available at:
http://www.lusakatimes.com/2012/02/06/cancel-concession-zambia-railways-tiz/
39
Pré Sal, Ferrovias, available at: http://pre-sal.info/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=115&Itemid=98
40
PriceWaterHouseCoopers, “Annual independent audit report on Vale-Estrada de Ferro Vitória-Minas“ (PWC, 2010)
41
A. Mody, “Infrastructure strategies in East Asia: the untold story,” (Washington D.C.: The World Bank, 1997)
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Recommendation Two: To maximize throughput and economic efficiency along
the supply chain, a) develop an effective operating coordination mechanism in a
non-fully integrated situation, b) require a double-track system in all situations.
While separating ownership of mine, rail and port assets reduces the potential for
monopolization of infrastructure, it also increases the difficulty of coordinating between
users and maximizing throughput of the system as a whole. The situation is even more
acute when the ownership of the assets is separated from the service provider42. One
must recognize that shared use can impair operating efficiency and strategic planning of
the infrastructure assets.
Accordingly, it is important to develop an effective coordinating mechanism that can
optimize the mine/rail and rail/port interfaces for all users of the system, both in the
short-term (day to day coordination of train scheduling, loading, maintenance, etc), and
in the long-term (conducting system wide capacity planning).
One potential mechanism to achieve this is to establish a supply chain coordinator. This
is an independent entity that communicates with all participants in the supply chain to
maximize overall throughput. Moreover, the coordinator can also, through careful
contracting between all participants in the supply chain (mine investors, infrastructure
asset owners and infrastructure service providers), act as an arbiter that allocates
responsibility for any lost production to the appropriate party.
Box 3: The Hunter Valley Coal Chain Coordinator43
In the Hunter Valley coal chain, capacity constraints were encountered as early as the
1990s.44 The bottleneck has generally been the rail infrastructure. However, poor
operational linkages at the mine/rail and rail/port interfaces were also identified as
reducing overall system capacity. Accordingly, the Hunter Valley Coal Chain Planning
Group (HCCPG) was established in 2003 as a trial between Port Watarah Coal
Services (PWCS), the port owner, and Pacific National, the rail operator, to optimize
planning and scheduling of coal train movements and shipments, as well as to
coordinate maintenance. This evolved into the Hunter Valley Coal Chain Logistics Team
(HVCCLT) in 2005, and membership expanded to include QR National as the other train
operator, ARTC as the track owner and Newcastle Port Corporation as the port
authority. The HVVCLT had responsibility for day-to-day coordination as well as longterm system wide capacity planning, to avoid misalignments between mines, rail and
port. Its role was essentially to act as one manager who has responsibility to act in the
42

Gomez-Ibanez shows how the division between ownership of the rail tracks and ownership of the trains led to a
lack of investment and to the subsequent deterioration of the quality of the tracks. The separation of ownership
hampered coordination and the feasibility of agreements on network improvements - J. A. Gomez-Ibanez,
“Regulating Coordination: British Railroads,” in Regulating Infrastructure: monopoly, Contracts, and Discretion
(Harvard University Press, 2003) and Moran and Pengilley add that the fact that the ownership of the tracks is
independent from the ownership of the rolling stock fails to provide an incentive to the rolling stock owner to
economize on the infrastructure owned by the track owner. See: A. Moran and W. Pengilley, "Access to facilities: Is
the court or a regulator the best adjudicator?," in Regulation of Infrastructure: Its Development and Effects
(Melbourne, Australia: Institute of Public Affairs, 2007), available at: http://ipa.org.au/library/MORAN_PENGILLEYInfrastructure.pdf
43
Hunter Valley Coal Chain Coordinator, www.hvccc.com.au/AboutUs/Pages/History.aspx
44
F. Affleck, “Exploration of some factors contributing to under-provision of infrastructure capacity: Coal railway
networks in Queensland and the Hunter Valley of New South Wales” (Perth, Australia: Planning and Transport
Research Centre, 2005)
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interest of the entire coal chain to increase transport chain efficiency through improved
scheduling practices and train productivity, optimizing the rail network and maximizing
stockpiles and throughput at the export ports. It was established through a
Memorandum of Understanding among the parties.
Ultimately, in 2009, the HVCCLT evolved into the Hunter Valley Coal Chain Coordinator
(HVCCC), an independent entity that also included representation from the coal miners.
The HVCCC has an independent CEO and Chairman. Its responsibilities now include
determination of actual capacity usage and making findings as to fault if system losses
occur, with financial implications.
The HVCCC model is generally seen as successful due to its broad stakeholder
representation, independent leadership and its legal powers. The model has been
substantially duplicated in the Queensland coal chain through the establishment of the
Integrated Logistics Centre established in 2009 as a coordinating body between the port
owner, port operator, rail owner, rail operators and coal producers.
In addition, developing and requiring a double track system is much more conducive to
a shared use system since it reduces the operational bottlenecks that can occur due to
the combination of inbound and outbound trains on a single-track. In Box 4, the World
Bank demonstrates the economic irrationality of building single-track lines parallel to the
Arcelor Mittal line in Liberia.
Box 4: World Bank report makes the case for a double-track system in Liberia
“The operational and financial benefits of a double track system over development of
two parallel lines are unambiguous. A simulation of these two possible scenarios – two
parallel single track systems versus one integrated double track system – serves to
illustrate the economic issues that arise. First, the investment costs of the integrated
double track system are significantly lower at US$629 versus US$826 million: a saving
of 24 percent. Second, moving up to three million tonnes of iron ore per month on a
single track line is a challenging task involving carefully planned operations, since it
could easily entail 15 train rotations per day implying at least 30 train crossings (of
inbound and outbound locomotives) that need to be planned and monitored. A double
track system avoids all the operational difficulties associated with crossing of inbound
and outbound trains on a single track system. As a result, trains can move faster, with
the average velocity rising from 60 to 70 kilometers per hour. Third, for the same
reason, longer trains can be used with locomotives pulling 105 rather than only 70
wagons each. As a result, fewer locomotives and drivers are needed on a double track
system, leading to significant savings in operating costs as well as capital costs. Fourth,
track maintenance costs from a double track system are substantially lower than on two
parallel tracks, even accounting for the more intensive use of the double track. When
the investment and lifetime operating cost savings are fully taken into account, the
double line generates savings of US$313 million over and above the two single lines.”45

45

World Bank, “Leveraging investments by natural resource concessionaires,” (2011), op.cit
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Recommendation Three: Apply regulation related to shared use so as to ensure
financially sustainable models: freedom to set tariffs, a last resort arbitration
mechanism, take or pay contracts; and specifically to shared use with general
cargo: subsidies, cross-subsidization and open-access service roads
Creating a financially sustainable economic model is critical for the long-term success of
the infrastructure system. The owner of the infrastructure assets and provider of the
infrastructure services must be able to generate sufficient revenue to justify their upfront
investment and ongoing involvement. Generally, this means granting maximum
flexibility to set tariffs and allowing long-term contracts, subject to competition laws. If
socially beneficial traffic is unable to pay its own way, then Government subsidies may
be needed. If Government subsidies are unaffordable, cross-subsidization and open
access service roads can be a solution. This section will first give a broad panorama of
access management regimes and then develop the key considerations in access
regulation.
(i)

Observed access regimes

Our study has shown that a variety of different access regimes have been developed
around the world, from access control through state-ownership of the designated
infrastructure, to blanket access regimes where the regulator generically determines
access rules on all types of natural monopolies, industry-specific access regimes, caseby-case public-private arrangements, or contract-based private endeavors.
First, one way to ensure access to resource-based transportation infrastructure has
been through state ownership of the infrastructure or state ownership of a golden share
in the capital of the infrastructure as explained in Recommendation 1.
A second possible regulatory framework for access management is through a blanket
access regime, encompassing all kinds of national infrastructure-related matters. This
has been the solution adopted by the Australian government. Indeed, Australia is a
unique case since the country has a National Access Regime since 1975, as per Part
IIIA of the Competition and Consumer Act of 201046 (see Box 15 and Box 19). This
model inspired New Zealand, which chose a similar generic system to regulate access
to all natural monopoly industries.47 This framework has also been proposed to other
countries, as some Australian officials together with the World Bank have advised
countries such as Mongolia on the implementation and development of specific mining
infrastructure access regimes.48 Here, adjudication can be made either through the
judicial system or by a specialized administrative agency.49
46

Part IIIA of the Competition and Consumer Act of 2010 (formerly referred to as Part IIIA of the Trade Practices
(National Access Regime) Act of 1975). See also J. Feil, “Third party access to infrastructure – Why, when and
why?," Eleventh Annual Global Iron Ore and Steel Conference, National Competition Council (2008), available at:
http://www.ncc.gov.au/images/uploads/STPA-002.pdf
47
B. N. Gundersen, “Understanding the open access regime,” Paper presented at the 1998 New Zealand Petroleum
Conference, available at: http://www.nzpam.govt.nz/cms/petroleum/conferences/conference-proceedings1998/understanding-the-open-access-regime
48
J. Feil, on behalf of the Australian National Competition Council for a presentation organized by the World Bank in
Southern Mongolia, “Third-Party access to infrastructure,” (2008), available at
:
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTMONGOLIA/Resources/5_National_Competition_Council_Third_party_access
_to_infrastructure.pdf
49
See discussion in Recommendation 5.
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A third access management regime has been to regulate infrastructure through
industry-specific laws. In the United States, for example, a mining company owning a
railway operating in interstate commerce would fall under the authority of the Surface
Transportation Board50 (see Box 7) whereas its port would fall under the laws applicable
to maritime infrastructure, e.g. the Federal Maritime Commission where it is involved in
foreign commerce.51 Australia and New Zealand also have industry-specific access laws
in addition to their generic access regime.52
Both in the US and in Australia, the access regime is based on an antitrust doctrine and
as such open access can only be requested by competitors: companies that are not
operating on the same market segment, such as small commercial, industrial or
agricultural businesses, are therefore not entitled to request access under this regime.
In Australia however, the framework has recently been expanded in order to apply not
only to competing companies, but to all businesses,53 although so far courts have been
reticent to generally force open access.54
A fourth access management regime is contract-based, and therefore realized on a
case-by-case basis according to market rules. The case of the Mbalam Iron Ore project
is a good example (Box 14).
An additional way to ensure access has been through case-by-case public declarations,
like in Australia (see Box 15). Depending on the type of asset considered, the owner
can be imposed access regulations by the government, either through a contract or
through a specific act or declaration.55 This solution can have the advantage of being
tailored to the specific nature of the infrastructure considered as well as to the needs of
the parties, provided that both parties have sufficient bargaining power to negotiate their
terms. But as a case-by-case approach it also induces a high level of uncertainty.
Each of those models has advantages and disadvantages, and they can co-exist within
the same jurisdiction. But some elements are key common considerations throughout
the spectrum of those regulatory regimes, such as defining tariff policies and
determining the duration of the access agreements between customers and
infrastructure owners.

50

49 CFR § 1000–1332 (2012). See also OECD, “Roundtable on Ensuring Access to Key Capacity for New Entrants
– United States,” Working Paper No. 2 on Competition and Regulation, No. DAF/COMP/WP2/WD(2006)10 (Paris:
OECD, 2006), available at: http://www.ftc.gov/bc/international/docs/EnsuringAccessKeyCapacity-UnitedStates.pdf
51
46 CFR § 501–565 (2012)
52
For a review of industry-specific access regimes in Australia, see Productivity Commission, Review of the National
Access Regime, Report No. 17 (Canberra: Productivity Commission, 2001), available at:
http://www.pc.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0020/18173/access.pdf. For a review of industry-specific access regimes
in New Zealand, see Gundersen, op. cit.
53
See Preambule of the Competition Principles Agreement (as amended to 13 April 2007) (“apply[ing] to all
businesses in Australia regardless of ownership”) and Clause 6(1)(c) of the Competition Principles Agreement (as
amended to 13 April 2007) (referring to the fact that the facility must be “of national significance … to constitutional
trade or commerce.”)
54
J. Feil, “Third party access to infrastructure – Why, when and why?," (2008), op. cit.
55
In Australia, this process is referred to as “declaration”. A claimant first sends a request for access to a designated
facility to the National Competition Council. The latter then sends its recommendation to the government as to
whether the government should “declare” the facility as subject to access. See Productivity Commission, op. cit.
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(ii)

Setting tariffs

The infrastructure owners must be able to charge sufficient fees to users to recoup the
upfront capital costs of rehabilitation (for brownfield projects) or construction (for
greenfield projects) and their ongoing operation costs, along with a reasonable profit
margin.
Of course, a sustainable financial model requires customers who are able and willing to
pay the tariffs determined. This depends critically on the economic profile of the area
where the infrastructure is located (density of mines in the area, other potential rail/port
users) as well as the availability of alternative transport options (in particular,
competition from road haul). The prospects for financial stability are best where there
are many potential users and little competition from road, and worst where there are few
potential users and significant competition from roads.
Assuming the economic profile is favorable, there are certain tariff models that seem to
work better in practice.
One option, used throughout Australia, is a light touch “negotiate-first, arbitrate-later”
regulatory model whereby the infrastructure owner and customers independently
contract on prices. Under such a system, one possibility is that the owner publishes a
“reference tariff” for haulage that sets the baseline for negotiations. Variations from this
price may only be permitted to reflect differences in costs (direct or indirect) or risks,
and hence prices will be broadly similar for similar customers. The alternative is that the
owner, while being free to set the prices for access, must charge its own downstream
business unit the same price as it charges other users.
Where customers are unhappy with the prices being offered, and feel that the owner is
charging monopolistic prices, they should be able to complain to an independent body
(i.e. the regulator) that would then investigate the issue and determine a fair price, after
conducting a detailed examination of costs56.
An alternative system, used in the EFVM railway in Brazil, is more burdensome on the
infrastructure service provider, as it requires contracts to be pre-approved by the
regulator to prevent monopolistic pricing (see Box 5).
Box 5: Requirement imposed on the concessionaire in Brazil
According to the concession contract, the concessionaire is required to operate “mutual
traffic”. If for any reason the concessionaire cannot operate mutual traffic, it must
concede open access to other interested third-party users through bilateral contracts
defining fees, rules and volumes. These contracts must be submitted to the concession
grantor (the Federal State), to be approved and to prevent abuse of economic power
(Clause 9, XXI – Concession Contract of Vitorias e Minas ).
In the case of an impasse, the applicable tariff is determined by the regulator based on
an assessment of operational costs. This system may be more appropriate in the
particular EFVM context, where the railway is operated at full capacity and owned and
56

See Recommendation 5 for a discussion on the topic.
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operated by the same private entity (Vale), and hence there is a greater risk of
monopolistic behavior.
Even the light-touch negotiate-arbitrate model can be burdensome where there are
large differences between the parties (see Box 6).
Box 6: Potential issues with the negotiate-arbitrate model
Capital expansion plans at the Dalrymple Bay Coal Terminal in Queensland, Australia,
were delayed almost two years due to a standoff over prices between terminal users
and the terminal operator. In 2003, Prime Infrastructure, the then-operator of the port
facility proposed an increase in the coal tariff from A$2.08 to A$2.77/tonne, based on an
asset valuation of A$1.1 billion. By contrast, the mining customers wanted a reduction in
tariff to A$1.00/tonne, as they claimed the port was worth less than A$500 million. An
impasse followed, requiring the regulator to arbitrate the matter. The arbitration process
took two years, with the draft decision released in April 2005. The regulator blamed the
long timeframe on the “wide divergence” in views between the parties, as well as
“material errors in submitted documents” and the lack of a “detailed asset register for
the terminal.”57 Eventually, the regulator authorized a price of A$1.72/tonne.
The issue described above illustrates the difficulty faced by a regulatory power in
monitoring the legitimacy of tariffs set by the regulated infrastructure owner. Those
tariffs should rightly cover costs but those costs are not easily auditable by the
regulatory power. Costs can be inflated by the regulated entity and disputed by the
regulatory power endlessly, which makes the regulation inefficient, which is why a lighttouch model (i.e. not engaging the regulatory power at first) is encouraged.
A solution that has been found in the United States to cope with this regulatory issue is
to impose the burden on the proof on the “captive shipper”(see Box 7).
Box 7: The United States railway regulator and the burden of the proof on the
captive shipper
Outside of a merger review, where a new railway acquirer can be imposed trackage
rights on public interest grounds, the Surface Transportation Board (STB) regulating the
railways sector can regulate access rates on a railway infrastructure where it is seized
by a "captive shipper", i.e. a company willing to transport its freight that has no other
choice but to use the designated infrastructure. Under U.S. federal law, a company can
file a request to challenge a railway rate.
The shipper needs to prove[s] first that the rail carrier is in a situation of “market
dominance”58 to transport the traffic. Here, a railroad will be found to have “market

57

Queensland Competition Authority, “Dalrymple Bay Coal Terminal Draft Access Undertaking: final decision” (April
2005), p. v-vi.
58
Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) Termination Act of 1995, 49 U.S.C. 1010 et seq., PUBLIC LAW No. 104–
88 (1995), §§10701, 10704(b), 10707 [hereinafter ICC Termination Act], available at:
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-104publ88/pdf/PLAW-104publ88.pdf
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dominance” where its revenue “meets or exceeds 180 percent of its variable costs for
the traffic to which the rate applies.”59
Second, the STB must decide whether the rate was reasonable. The test for
reasonableness has been developed in the STB’s rate guidelines.60 First, the STB
recognizes that charges can be higher for captive shippers, which have inelastic
demand, than for competitive shippers, which have alternative shipment routes and
which would therefore divert their traffic from the designated railway if they do not
benefit from competitive prices.61 But the STB asserts that a captive shipper should not
have to pay for services from which it does not benefit, and should not cross-subsidize
other shippers.62 To verify this, the STB resorts to the Stand-Alone-Cost method. Under
this method, one determines the rate that would be applied for shipment on a
hypothetical railroad, the Stand-Alone Railroad (SARR), that would serve the same
railway route and that would be optimally efficient.63 This amount, “plus a reasonable
and economic profit or return (or both) on capital employed in the business,”64 is the
maximum amount that the railroad may collect from its shippers. A rate above that
threshold will be considered unreasonable.
In 2009, for instance, the STB found that the rail-route configuration for the railways
owned by BNSF Railway Company (BNSF) in Wyoming, which transport an annual
volume of 8 million tons of coal from mines in Wyoming’s Powder River Basin to Moba
Junction, Wyoming, gave BNSF market dominance over its captive shippers, Western
Fuels Association, Inc. and Basin Electric Power Cooperation.. The STB found the rate
charged for the transportation was six times higher than the variable cost for the
provision of such service. As a result, the STB ordered BNSF to pay US$ 345 million in
reparation and rate reductions, which is the largest penalty that has been imposed in
the history of US captive shipper litigation. The STB concluded that the burden of the
proof was met by the captive shippers. But the award is subject to final re-assessment,
as the case has been appeal by BNSF.65
Generally the burden on the proof put on the shipper limits the application of the open
access regime.

59

ICC Termination Act, §10707(d)(1)(A). The method applied here to calculate variable costs is either the “Uniform
Rail Costing System” or an “adequate substitute.” See ICC Termination Act, §10707(d)(1)(B); Adoption of the Uniform
R.R. Costing Sys., 5 I.C.C.2d 894, 1989 WL 246927 (1989)
60
The Revenue Shortfall Allocation Method (RSAM) used by the STB to test the reasonableness of rail rates is
developed in the Rate Guidelines-Non-Coal Proceedings 1 S.T.B. 1004 (1996), and in the Coal Rate Guidelines,
Nationwide, 1 I.C.C.2d 520, 1985 WL56819 (1985)
61
Rate Guidelines-Non-Coal Proceedings 1 S.T.B. 1004 (1996), at 2–5
62
See Coal Rate Guidelines, 1 I.C.C.2d at 523-24; BNSF Ry. Co. v. STB, 453 F.3d 473, at 476–77. (D.C.Cir.2006).
63
See PPL Mont., LLC v. STB, 437 F.3d 1240, 1242 (D.C.Cir.2006)
64
ICC Termination Act, §10704(a)(2)
65
See Western Fuels Association, Inc. and Basin Electric Power Cooperation v. BNSF Railway Company, STB
Docket No. 42088 (2009), available at:
http://www.stb.dot.gov/decisions/readingroom.nsf/WebDecisionID/39709?OpenDocument
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(iii)

Duration of contracts between customers and infrastructure owners

The duration of contracts between infrastructure service providers and customers
depends not only on private negotiations, but also on the Government’s policy
objectives.
One option is to mandate “common carrier” provisions, which require the rail or port
owners to accept all customers on a first-come, first-served basis, for example,
according to monthly contracts. This reduces the potential for large customers (like
mining companies) to buy up the bulk of long-term supply, and allows smaller
companies a better chance of acquiring access to the infrastructure. Rail freight
providers often operate on a common carrier basis.
Alternatively, regulations may allow providers and customers to enter into long-term
contracts. This is generally preferred by infrastructure service providers as it provides
more certainty. Long-term contracting is the norm in systems requiring capacity
expansion.
Indeed, where capacity expansion is required, the investment cost must be recoverable
and revenue streams sufficiently definite into the future to enable the owner to obtain
financing on reasonable terms. Moreover, the cost of capacity expansion should be
spread across all users (even the non-owners),66 not just new users. Otherwise, new
entrants would be penalized.
If capacity expansion is likely, allowing long-term “take or pay” contracts (whereby the
customers commit to buying a minimum amount of capacity from the owner over a
longer period) provides more certainty for infrastructure owners to commit to capacity
expansions. This is usually necessary to obtain financing for the investment required.
However, such contracts also risk locking out small producers who cannot support such
contracts on their balance sheet.
Furthermore, even where take-or-pay contracts are available, regulation may be
required to force infrastructure asset owners to upgrade capacity where there is
sufficient demand. This is particularly the case where the asset owners may otherwise
have reasons to keep capacity constrained (e.g. to retain a competitive advantage).
Recent arrangements concluded in Australia provide interesting examples of obligations
on asset owners to conduct capacity expansion, where certain criteria are met (see Box
8).
Box 8: Requirement to expand port capacity in certain cases in Hunter Valley
Coal Chain
In the Hunter Valley of Australia, the port terminal owner is required to expand the
facility where there is sufficient demand from users who are willing to commit to longterm contracts.67
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Originally, a common user obligation imposed on the port owners prevented them from
entering into long-term take-or-pay contracts with customers who were willing to commit
to sufficient volumes to justify expansion. These issues may have led to a slow
expansion in capacity during the mid-2000s when prices increased sharply.
Capacity expansion problems have largely been resolved through the long-term
Capacity Framework Arrangement (CFA), which replaces the common user model. The
CFA, approved in 2009, provides for:
-‐ the allocation of capacity to customers under long-term contracts;
-‐ an obligation on the port operator68 to conduct expansion where there is sufficient
contracted demand;
-‐ alignment of capacity and contractual incentives across the supply chain (particularly
with rail); and
-‐ potential to impose a levy on all customers to fund capacity expansion, so that new
entrants are not penalized with a higher charge while existing customers can enjoy
low legacy charges.
The CFA was developed following long negotiations with industry and enjoys broad
support.
(iii) Specific regulatory solutions for shared use with disperse, low- volume
general cargo
If the Government wishes to provide access to services that cannot pay their own way
(passengers, low-volume general cargo),69 then there must be a mechanism for
providing revenue support. It is important to realize that the burden of providing these
services will either be borne by the Government (if subsidies70 are paid), or by other
users (through higher access charges). In either case, the infrastructure owner will pass
on the costs.
Open access to passenger services, in the African concession arrangements is typically
granted through Public Service Obligation (PSO) schemes. These schemes require the
concessionaire to operate, for a given subsidy and for the duration of the agreement, a
specified service of public transport that is not profitable enough to be submitted to free
market rules. Other similar schemes can be stipulated for general cargo. The track
record is that PSO or other subsidies are generally not implemented in the African
cases that we reviewed, because states cannot afford it. “Even if a Government were to
provide subsidy, it might actually deter investors because of the Government’s limited
long term creditability.”71
If subsidies are unaffordable by the Government and no other solution is devised, it
might be uneconomic to impose shared use with general cargo on the mining railways,
as scattered carloads related to dispersed farmers (or passenger stations) complicate
the economics of the rail.
68

In Australia, the port operator is responsible for the capital investment. In other settings, it can be the port owner,
depending on the agreement.
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The pricing of the railway access above the marginal cost pricing is a deterrent to passenger and agriculture cargo
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If the road transportation can be a temporary good alternative for passenger services,
the road considerably locks in the potential of commercial agriculture in Africa especially
on long-haul. This is therefore important to devise solutions that will enable the open-up
of the African agriculture by the railways. Here are possible options:
1) Under the model of separated ownership prescribed in Recommendation 1, one
option is to contractually require from the third party commercial operator to apply
price discrimination among users and cross-subsidization between the higherprofit mining industry and the price-sensitive agriculture industry: the agriculture
industry will pay the affordable marginal cost while the mineral industry will pay
the difference between the marginal cost and the average cost.72 Even under this
model, the dispersion of farmers’ car loads is problematic for the railway
economics. Therefore individual carloads bound for the port should be delivered
to and consigned at locations where they are assembled onto trains, so that they
only proceed to the port when they constitute a full train and the access charge is
therefore shared by all the owners of the carloads.
2) If the Government fails to impose shared use and no logistic solution is in place
to cope with the dispersion of farmers, the Government could require the
infrastructure owner (be it the mine owner or a third party) to render the goodquality service roads, built for the maintenance of the railways, open access to
the rural economy.
Recommendation Four: Require the mine owner to build infrastructure with
excess capacity, and consider various financing options to finance this extracapacity
A recurring issue for Government is how to encourage infrastructure asset owners to
construct or at least design the asset with sufficient capacity for future growth, rather
than “just big enough” for the primary user. The likelihood of the infrastructure asset
being built with limited capacity is increased where the infrastructure owner is also the
mine owner, and it fears that building or even designing extra capacity will invite a
requirement for shared use, increasing competition and/or reducing operational
efficiency.
In these circumstances, there may be a strong case for the Government to require the
asset owner to design the infrastructure such that it has capacity larger than is
immediately required to ensure sufficient capacity for future shared use (as in the
proposed Putu development in Liberia – see Box 9 below).
Box 9: Section 6 of the Putu Contract stipulates that “the Railroad shall be designed
so that it can be expanded on a commercially feasible basis to carry on a continuing
basis twice as much traffic as is anticipated initially, but the Company is under no
obligation to build such capacity.” If a third-party wants access it has to pay for the
expansion of the railroad.
72
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Defining how much extra capacity should be required in the design from the
concessionaire is a difficult exercise for which two approaches can be adopted: a fixed
contract approach (capacities and duration are determined by the infrastructure owner
and the users and the infrastructure is built accordingly), or an anticipatory approach
(the infrastructure owner or the Government anticipates the demand for infrastructure
and builds it accordingly, which triggers a higher business risk since the demand is not
secured at the outset).
In the absence of a fixed contract approach, the anticipatory approach needs to be
adopted, which requires a difficult exercise of planning. The Indian model is a model of
good practice (see Box 10 below) of Government-level planning capacity.
Box 10: The planning capacity of state-owned Indian Railways
Almost all mine-port railway connectivity projects in India are joint ventures between
private and public stakeholders together with Indian Railways (IR), the national railway
company owned and controlled by the Government of India via the Ministry of Railways.
Prior to forming a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) for new line and/or gauge conversion
projects, project development is undertaken by IR by hiring consulting firms to establish
project design and cost, land acquisition requirements, other project component
requirements, as well as project bankability and viability.73
As stated above, depending on the concentration of economic activity and distances,
all-weather roads can be sometimes a better solution to open up agriculture potential
than requiring shared use and increase capacity. Determining this however requires a
planning effort and to this end Columbia University has suggested to the Government of
Mozambique, the realization of a detailed, aspirational, ambitious, long-term
infrastructure map for transportation, energy and information and communication
technology (ICT), coordinating and guiding public and private infrastructure investments
(see Box 11).
Box 11: An aspirational 10-year map to plan the infrastructure needs and capacity
expansion74
In order to be a meaningful tool for long-term infrastructure development along the
corridors of economic development, the map should be an aspirational 10-year plan,
indicating all the infrastructure necessary for national development by 2020 (including
power, roads, rail, energy, ports, fiber-optic cables, and mobile telephone networks).
This map would indicate how the various infrastructure networks (transport, ICT,
energy), overseen by different ministries, interact to promote corridor development. A
clear understanding of the spatial distribution of current and potential economic activity
as well as of the geographic and demographic features along the corridor can
strategically inform infrastructure priorities.
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This policy instrument would help identify the potential for shared infrastructure
platforms between natural resource concessionaires and other users; identifying shared
infrastructure platforms can promote economies of scale, potentially reduce
environmental disruption, and create the basis for engaging other partners, designing
cost-sharing arrangements or informing policy. A 10-year ambitious plan might lead to
the constitution of a special fund to facilitate more investment in rail, roads, ports, and
other critical infrastructure to support the workforce and jobs in regional and mining
communities, and along transport corridors.
The map would also help anticipate the demand for various forms of infrastructure along
the corridors, by assessing the potential economic activity and its related potential
infrastructure demands. Anticipating necessary infrastructure upgrades before reaching
capacity gridlocks can help to ensure that capacity constraints do not block potential
growth. Finally, the map would help identify the projects that, although critical for the
development, are stalled or neglected for various reasons, including disagreements
between stakeholders or lack of financing.
To finance the additional cost of extra capacity, potential third party financing options
could be considered. Several models have been observed.
In the first model, the mine owner retains 100% ownership of the infrastructure and
opens it to other operators on a fee-for-service basis (usage fees), under Master
Service Agreements. The initial operator specifies generic terms for the third-party
access agreements in the master service agreement and then defines specific
arrangements with each operator in subsequent agreements. There is a “first-mover
advantage,” since the first-mover company gets to set the direction and the terms of the
agreement. The regulatory challenge here is to make sure that such usage fees are
reasonable and fixed on a non-discriminatory basis. The Marampa mine in Sierra Leone
is an illustration (see Box 12).
Box 12: Sierra Leone - the Marampa Iron Ore Project
The Marampa Iron Ore Project is a mining project located near the town of Lunsar in
Sierra Leone, currently being evaluated for the production of a high-grade hematite iron
ore concentrate. The Marampa Project is known to have a mineral resource of 680
million tons. Through approximately 80 km of rail infrastructure, the Marampa Project is
connected to an existing deep-water port, ship loader and stockpile area in Pepel.
Inititally, African Minerals owned the entirety of the Marampa Iron Ore Project. In
November 2008, African Minerals obtained a lease from the Government of Sierra
Leone for the railway from Marampa to Pepel and Pepel Port, giving the company the
right to access and operate the existing rail and port infrastructure for an annual fee of
US $250,000.75 Notably, in the 99-year lease agreement, the government of Sierra
Leone obligates third-party accessibility of the rail and port infrastructure after African
Minerals upgrades the facilities, by stating “the Port and the Railway be made available
at commercial rates to other users including mining companies and general cargo and
passenger transporters.” With the aforementioned lease, African Minerals undertook
rehabilitation and reinstatement of the railway line, along with building a 120 km
75
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extension to new mines in the Tonkolili area, also in Sierra Leone. In 2009, Cape
Lambert acquired the Marampa Iron Ore Project from African Minerals, allowing African
Minerals to focus on the development of its flagship Joint Ore Reserve Committeecompliant Tonkolili project, known to have 5.1 billion tons of iron ores.76
Cape Lambert Resources, now with a 100% stake in the Marampa project, signed an
agreement in April 2012 with African Minerals, gaining access to transport
infrastructure.77 In addition to providing access to the railway to transport iron ore
concentrate to the operating Pepel Port, African Minerals will provide Cape Lambert
with train sets and materials handling facilities at the port with the capacity to unload
and stockpile up to 200,000 tons of the iron ore concentrate. It will also arrange for
stockpile reclaiming and loading of iron ore concentrate onto transhipping vessels at
Pepel Port. African Minerals’ fees for the service of rail transportation, port handling,
transhipping and ship loading of Marampa Concentrate are at a cost plus 20 percent
basis.78 The rail and port infrastructure requires further refurbishment and upgrading,
but access to existing rail and port infrastructure reduces the project’s capital
investment and lead time for Cape Lambert. However, Cape Lambert will still need to
design and build a 34 km rail spur line from the Marampa project to the existing
railway.79
Cape Lambert is developing Marampa in two stages, separated by mode of transport. In
the first phase, up to 4 million tons of hematite iron ore will be produced each year. The
ore will be transported by rail to the operating port in Pepel. The second stage will entail
an increase in production to at least 10 million tons each year, with the output to be
pumped through pipelines to the deep-water port that is being developed by African
Minerals.
In the second model, one operator solicits other operators to get involved under a joint
venture agreement: the ownership is shared. The initial operator sets up a company and
then sells shares to external investors/operators, or all operators create a joint venture
company. All the operators participate in the initial upfront investment costs and/or in
the building and operating of the infrastructure. In exchange, each operator enjoys
access rights to the shared assets. While operators compete initially for the market
share, they end up cooperating to optimize the throughput. The regulatory challenge
here is to make sure that other companies can enter later on, on a non-discriminatory
basis and under fair financial terms. The greenfield Simandou Ore project in Guinea is
an illustration of this model (see Box 13).

76

C. de Bruyn, “Cape Lambert buys rest of Marampa project,” Mining Weekly (November, 25 2009), available at:
http://www.miningweekly.com/article/cape-lambert-buys-rest-of-marampa-project-from-african-minerals-2009-11-25
77
Cape Lambert - Projects and Investments: Marampa Iron Ore, available at:
http://www.capelam.com.au/irm/content/projects_marampa.html
78
“Marampa Signs Binding Heads Of Agreement,” (April 16, 2012), available at: http://www.4-traders.com/CAPELAMBERT-RESOURCES-LI-6494262/news/Cape-Lambert-Resources-Limited-Marampa-Signs-Binding-Heads-ofAgreement-14272440/
79
Cape Lambert - Projects and Investments: Marampa Iron Ore, op. cit.
Leveraging Extractive Industry Infrastructure Investments for Broad Economic Development: Regulatory, Commercial, and Operational Models for Railways and Ports

26

Box 13: Guinea: Simandou Iron Ore project
The Simandou railway will be a trans-guinean 650km railway linking iron ore mines at
Simandou to a new port near Matakang. The first ore shipment is planned for mid-2015.
Simfer S.A. is the mine owner of Simandou Blocks 3 and 4, or “Simandou South.”
Simfer S.A. is owned by Rio Tinto, the International Financial Corporation (IFC), and the
Aluminium Corporation of China Limited (CHALCO). Under the settlement agreement
signed between Simfer S.A. and the Government of Guinea on April 22, 2011, Simfer
S.A. owns the port and railway. The settlement agreement provides that the
Government of Guinea has the right to take a stake of up to 35 % in Simfer S.A. (the
mine) and a 51 % stake in a special purpose vehicle (SPV) that will be set up to build,
operate and own the mining infrastructure (the rail and port)80. Currently, the SPV is
planned to be held at 51% by a joint venture between the state-owned investment
company (Société Guinéenne du Patrimoine Minier) and African Iron Ore Group (now
Severstal Liberia Iron Ore Ltd.), and at 49% by the entities owning Simfer S.A. (Rio
Tinto, CHALCO, and the IFC).81
According to the terms of the settlement agreement, Simfer S.A. is to enjoy “priority use”
as a “foundation customer.” But the line will also be available for passenger and other
freight trains, and Simfer S.A., as operator of the joint venture, may haul other mineral
producers' ore subject to commercial agreements82. Other potential third-party
operators, for now, are: BHP Billiton, Arcelor Mittal, and London Mining PLC. Third-party
operators that are willing to participate in the infrastructure joint venture are required to
fully fund their proportion of the infrastructure capital cost and their share in the joint
venture will be proportional to their share in the capital cost.
After 30 years, the ownership of the infrastructure assets will revert to the Government.
The management of the infrastructure will then be put to international tender and as a
foundation customer, Simfer will benefit from lower access charges.
For the Sundance project, the model for third-party access is still undecided (see Box
14).
Box 14: Cameroon greenfield development - the Mbalam Iron Ore Railway
The Mbalam iron ore railway is planned to be 510 km long and an integral part of the
Mbalam Iron Ore Project, a mine operated by Sundance Resources Limited (Australia)
(“Sundance”).83 The railway will be dedicated to the transport of iron ore from the
deposits in Cameroon and Congo to the port of Lolabé, on the Atlantic coast of
Cameroon. The railway will be owned and operated by Sundance, on the Cameroonian
side through its subsidiary Cam Iron SA (90% of which is owned by Sundance) and on
the Congolese side by Congo Iron SA (85% of which is owned by Sundance.)84
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Sundance is currently discussing infrastructure sharing arrangements with five private
mining operators with potential mining developments close to Sundance’s proposed
railway route. In May 2011, a non-binding preliminary agreement was signed between
Sundance and Legend Mining Limited regarding the usage of Sundance’s proposed rail
and port infrastructure by Legend Mining Limited.85 For now, the proposed
arrangements with those five companies have been to either charge them access fees
for the networks that remain exclusively operated by Sundance, under a master service
agreement in which capacities would be determined in advance and for specific
durations or make third-parties participate in the upfront costs through a joint build and
operate agreement.
The CEO and MD of Sundance reportedly said that “as a first-mover in this emerging
world-class iron ore region, the Company viewed it as very important to work in a spirit
of cooperation with neighbouring resources companies for the mutual benefit of all
stakeholders including the Government and people of Cameroon.”86
In the case of greenfield projects, it is particularly important to define the financial and
regulatory model that will encourage the infrastructure owner to design the infrastructure
to accommodate excess capacity to enable shared use of the infrastructure.
Encouraging (or mandating) excess capacity in the project planning phase would
counteract the potential ‘chilling’ effect on new investment if owners anticipate that third
party access may be mandated at a later stage. Without a clear framework at the
outset, the fear of mandated shared access at a later stage incentivizes owners to build
smaller than optimal facilities to create a capacity constraint, and thus avoid the threat
of regulated access. Australia was faced with this issue in 2002 (see Box 15).
Box 15: Australia’s third party access model – applicability to greenfield
infrastructure
Part IIIA of the Competition and Consumer Act of 2010 (previously the Trade Practices
Act of 1974) creates an explicit regulatory regime for “declaring” third party access to
essential infrastructure which it is uneconomical to duplicate.
The regulatory regime was designed to apply to existing, mature infrastructure. The
Productivity Commission’s report in 2002 recognized that it may not be appropriate for
greenfield investments. Gas pipeline companies have complained that: “we potentially
face a situation in the future of ‘spaghetti pipelines’ across the country where pipelines
are only built based on what the market will contract for today. The current regulatory
regime offers no incentive to build a pipeline with spare capacity which takes a risk on
the future market growth, and yet this is a time when it is most critical for the
development of the Australian gas industry.”87
More generally, the problem is uncertainty about future third party access, and the
terms on which it may be granted.
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There is evidence that this issue has in fact contributed to delays in construction of new
railways in Australia. Financiers were reluctant to back the Alice Springs to Darwin rail
project because of the threat that the railway would be declared open for third party
access. This was true even though the risk was regarded as low, due to strong
competition from road haulage.88
The Productivity Commission put forward several suggestions to make the regulatory
regime appropriate for greenfield investments:
-‐
-‐
-‐
-‐

Binding rulings: prior to construction, owners could ask the regulator for a
determination on whether the infrastructure falls under the access regime or not.
Framework undertakings: the owners draft an undertaking, which would detail the
terms and conditions of access for the lifetime of the asset, and seek endorsement
from the regulator.
Allowing a higher rate of return for greenfield investments, reflecting the greater risk
compared to established infrastructure.
Access “holidays” and other exemption arrangements: allowing the owner of
greenfield infrastructure to be exempt from third party access for a certain period
after construction – either for a defined period, until the net present value of the
project becomes positive, or for the lifetime of the asset.

A paper by Joshua Gans and Stephen King strongly argues in favor of access holidays
for greenfield infrastructure to overcome the regulatory truncation problem,89 as well as
to encourage investors to bring forward investments rather than delay.90
Finally, when it can afford it, the Government itself may take an equity stake in the
project. By participating directly in the building of the infrastructure, the Government can
reduce the financial burden on the infrastructure owner, and also influence shared use
through its equity stake. For example, all railway construction in India under the
PPP/SPV model involves the Government as an equity partner, holding a minimum of
26 percent equity shares to ensure voting rights (see Box 16 below).
Box 16: PPP greenfield development-the Krishnapatnam Railway Company
In the wake of a massive PPP investment plan for the Indian rail sector to eliminate
capacity bottlenecks, a Shareholders Agreement was signed on October 13, 2006
between Indian Railways’s (IR) SPV, Rail Vikas Nigam Limited (30% equity ownership),
Krishnapatnam Port Company Limited (30%), National Mineral Development
Corporation (15%), the State Government of Andhra Pradesh (13%), and Brahmani
Industries Limited (12%) for the creation of an SPV, Krishnapatnam Railway Company
Limited (KRCL), for implementation of the Obulavaripalle-Krishnapatnam New Railway
Line Project in Andhra Pradesh. The main rationale for the project was to provide
railway connectivity for the iron ore belt in the Hospet – Bellary area (in Karnataka state)
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to the Port; however, the railway is operated on the common carrier principle for public
transportation of goods and passengers. The project is expected to transport 20 million
tons of traffic, mainly comprising iron ore, barites, coal and food grains.91
Operation of this railway, as all railways in India, is controlled by Indian Railways (IR),
who conducts traffic with its own rolling stock, acting as a common carrier. Use of
dedicated non-IR rolling stock is permitted for a fee. For the duration of the concession
period (33 years), KRCL is responsible for maintenance of the project line to make it
“rail-worthy” at all times, including replacement/renewal of assets as per IR standards
and specifications. Supervision and certification of these requirements is done by IR,
with the specified charges paid by KRCL92. After the concession period, ownership of
the project line reverts back to IR. All users of the tracks, whether they are stakeholders
of the SPV or not, pay a fee to IR and annually IR reverses part of the fees to the SPV
stakeholders in return for their investments. The SPV stakeholders, by law, cannot
make more than an Internal Rate of Return of 14%.93
Financing an equity stake is a challenge for a Government facing major development
needs. The Government of Guinea, for example, funds its 51% stake in its joint venture
with Simfer S.A. through a special agreement with the African Iron Ore Group (AIOG)
that involves a type of “resource-for-infrastructure deal” with the Chinese Government
(see Box 17).
Box 17: Financing the Government of Guinea’s stake in Simfer S.A.
On 30 November 2011, AIOG signed a joint venture agreement with the state-owned
mining investment vehicle of the Republic of Guinea (“SOGUIPAMI”) to participate in
SPV Simfer. SPV Simfer is the special-purpose company responsible for building the
rail and port infrastructure of the Simandou Blocks 3 & 4, or “Simandou South” project
as mentioned in Box 13. AIOG will assist the Guinean Government to fund its
commitment of 51% ownership of the infrastructure. AIOG is an iron ore miner specialist
but also has expertise in capital mobilisation and marketing to enable rail and port
infrastructure development related to mining projects in Central and West Africa. This
expertise relies in particular on a partnership with China. AIOG’s model is to be paid in
iron-ore production proportionally to its investment in the capital cost of the
infrastructure; this production would be resold to China. 94
Resource-for-infrastructure deals are adopted more and more widely in Africa. They
have however two main limitations: they mortgage Africa’s economic mainstay and they
are not accompanied by railway management and maintenance solutions. Therefore
they should be adopted carefully95.
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Differently from Guinea, the Government of Madagascar found a special arrangement
with Rio Tinto and the World Bank to fund its share in the Port in Ehoala: Rio Tinto
directly signed an agreement with the World Bank, which is rare in the World Bank’s
typical dealings with governments.96 The World Bank become involved in the project
because it was concurrently undertaking a major regional development plan with the
Government of Madagascar through the ‘Integrated Growth Poles Project,’ and the port
was deemed integral to regional development in the area (see Box 18).97 This project
was ground-breaking in terms of revealing international willingness to move from mining
enclave model to regional integration model.
Box 18: Financing the Government of Madagascar’s stake in Ehoala
A joint venture between Rio Tinto (80%) and the Government of Madagascar (20%) has
developed Madagascar’s largest infrastructure project to date, an ilmenite mine and a
new public port in Ehoala, southwest of Fort Dauphin, on the southern tip of the island.
Rio Tinto funded 100% of the project's construction from 2006 until first production in
2009. At this point, the Malagasy government was due to fund its share of project costs
or dilute its interest.98 However, Rio Tinto signed an agreement directly with the World
Bank, where the World Bank lent $35 million to the Government of Madagascar in their
contribution towards construction of the port. Rio Tinto funded $240 million of the
project. Construction started in January 2006; the first shipment of ilmenite was sent
through the newly completed Port of Ehoala in May 2009.99
The deep-water Port of Ehoala was built not only to export ilmenite from the Rio
Tinto/QMM operation, but also serve cruise liners, container ships, and refrigeration
vessels, opening up new opportunities for the local economy.
Rio Tinto QMM currently manages the port operations. At the end of the life of the mine,
roughly projected to be about 40 years, the port will be entirely owned by the
government of Madagascar, falling under the jurisdiction of the Agence Portuaire
Maritime et Fluviale (APMF).100
Despite the fact that Rio Tinto’s operating port is designed to be multi-purpose, in effect
it only serves Rio Tinto’s needs. Indeed since the port is remote from all economic
activities, container- shipping activity is extremely modest (15,000 TEU over the past
three years)101. This example recalls that managing to require shared use from the
mining investments is not necessarily effective. The requirement needs to stem from a
national infrastructure plan assessing where the public-private coordination makes more
sense (as seen in Box 11).
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Recommendation five: Carefully draft legal provisions mandating shared use
which are clear, precise, based on objective criteria and simple to adjudicate, with
a clear legal remedy for their breach, and access to a forum for resolving
disputes
Legal language designed to ensure that competitors or other users have access to
infrastructure must be very explicitly drafted. In Australia, clauses that require the
infrastructure asset owner to provide shared use or third party access to other users
“without unduly prejudicing or interfering with its operations” have proved ineffective, as
owners consistently claim that shared use or third party access would interfere with its
operations. Even competition regulation designed to force owners to open up
infrastructure where it is “uneconomical to develop” (Australia) or “impractical to
duplicate” (US) an “essential” infrastructure has not worked (see Box 19 and Box 21).
Box 19: Lack of effective open access regulation in Western Australia
The iron ore railways were constructed in the 1960s following the discovery of
significant iron ore deposits in the remote Pilbara region. At the time, the State
Government of Western Australia lacked the budget to construct the infrastructure
required to build rail and/or port infrastructure in the Pilbara, and hence wanted to
encourage private investors to commit the large sums of capital required for economic
development of the region. To do this, the Government entered into agreements with
mine developers102 (ratified by Parliament) that set out the terms on which the
companies would develop their mines and associated infrastructure. The terms included
obligations on the state (e.g. making available necessary land for the mine, rail and port
construction) as well as on the miners (e.g. royalty payments).103
Most relevantly, the agreements oblige the mine operator to carry the freight of the state
and of third parties on its lines, where this does not interfere with its own operations.
The specific provision reads:
“the Company shall operate its railway in a safe and proper manner and where and to
the extent that it can do so without unduly prejudicing or interfering with its operations
hereunder… transport the passengers and carry the freight of the state and of third
parties on the railroad… for reasonable charges” (emphasis added).104
The requirement that third party haulage does not interfere with proprietary operations
has, predictably, meant that no third party freight has ever been transported on private
Pilbara lines.
Under separate federal legislation, the Minister, on recommendation from the
Competition Council, may require the owner of certain essential private assets to make
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them available to third parties where it is “uneconomical for anyone to develop another
facility to provide the service.”105
In 2011, the Federal Court ruled that “uneconomical” means “whether it is economically
feasible for someone in the marketplace to develop an alternative to the relevant facility.
It assesses whether it is, in fact, profitable for another person to duplicate the relevant
infrastructure.”106 The question is to be resolved by industry evidence. Any evidence
that shows it is profitable to privately duplicate the infrastructure is decisive, without
needing to debate the relative productive efficiencies.
This interpretation narrows the scope of infrastructure that can be declared open
access. Even if it is more efficient from society’s perspective for infrastructure to be
shared, as long as someone could duplicate the infrastructure and still profit, the court
will not order access.
Additionally, the legislation only provides access to excess capacity. If there is no
excess capacity, there can be no declaration of open access under the legislation.107
This case reflects the difficulty in imposing third party access on an integrated mine-railport system; as the system will generally be built only to the required capacity of the
mine, there will seldom be extra capacity available to other parties. Legal language that
grants rights of third party access where “reasonable” or “feasible” thus will seldom be
operational.
Provisions in African concession agreements obliging the concessionaire to allow
shared use of the asset have also generally proven ineffective due to vague language
(see Box 20).
Box 20: Shared use and third party access regulations in select African countries
Ivory Coast
In Ivory Coast, article 72 of the Mining Code provides that transportation networks that
belong to one operator and that “could possibly be used in common“(susceptibles d’un
usage commun) can be used by neighboring operators and be opened to public use.108
The Code mentions that this common usage should be defined in a convention signed
with neighboring operators, but no particular mechanism is foreseen.
Cameroon
In Cameroon, article 80 of the Mining Code provides that any construction that is
beneficial to several neighboring operators should be paid for by those operators in
proportion to the benefit it gives them. Under article 82, the routes created by one
operator can be used by other operators. There are two conditions. First, the third-party
operators must send a request asking for such use. The Mining Code does not detail
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whether the request must be sent to a public entity or to the initial operator. Second, the
use must not be prejudicial to the operator who owns them, or the operator must be
properly compensated for such use.109 But interestingly, the Mining Code provides that
in all cases, the charge of maintenance costs is always born by the initial operator.
Finally, the communication route can be declared of public interest (déclaration d’utilité
publique) and subject to the relevant expropriation measures, but this is not a
mandatory requirement to trigger shared use.
Burkina Faso
In Burkina Faso, shared use and third party access provisions in the regulatory
framework are slightly more developed. Article 69 of the Mining Code has the same
language as that of Ivory Coast. But such shared use is only possible if the owner of the
transport network is not adversely affected (à condition qu’il n’en résulte aucun
inconvénient pour l’exploitant) and if the owner is paid financial compensation as well as
the costs of usage and maintenance.110 This shared use must be subject to an
agreement between the different operators, and the Ministry of Mines is in charge of
defining the conditions and modalities for shared use. Importantly, article 69 paragraph
3 provides that such agreement is mandatory “where the preservation of the
environment requires it” (lorsque la préservation de l’environnement l’exige). But the
Code does not provide any further detail here.
Republic of Congo (ROC)
In the Republic of Congo, article 14 of the Mining Code provides that the Government
can create a public entity so as to intervene in any operation necessary for the
construction and development of mining infrastructure and has to participate in the
capital of any mining exploration company operating in the country.111 All mining-related
activities are regulated by the Ministry of Mines. Railways and other mine-related
transport infrastructure can benefit from right-of-way/easement of way (“servitudes
d’obligation et de passage”) under articles 109 and 113. Their construction and
development is subject to déclaration d’utilité publique under article 114, a status which
triggers the possibility of expropriation for public interest. All transportation networks that
have been declared of public interest (déclaration d’utilité publique) can be subject to a
public service obligation under article 114.3.
Legal provisions are more likely to be successful where they are clear, precise, based
on objective criteria and simple to adjudicate. There must be a clear legal remedy for
their breach, and access to a forum for resolving disputes. Typically, an independent
Government regulator will be responsible for monitoring compliance with owners’
undertakings, although this role can also be fulfilled by the courts or an independent
arbitrator. Nonetheless, realizing access through the judicial system rather than through
the administrative system can be a more uncertain process (see Box 21).
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Box 21: The US essential facilities doctrine: disagreements over scope of
application and outcomes
The U.S. essential facilities doctrine dates back to the 20th century and has been used
in particular in the case of railways and airports. In United States v. Terminal Railroad
Association of St Louis,112 the U.S. Supreme Court defined “essential facilities” as
“instrumentalities … of the greatest public utility,”113 exclusion from which (including
through the imposition of “arbitrary hauling charge[s]”114) would induce an “illegal
restraint of trade,”115 an “unnecessary duplication of facilities,”116 and an “attempt to
monopolize,”117 and which acquisition “cost to any one company is prohibitive.”118 In
Terminal Railroad, the court finally agreed that the infrastructure, the only existing
railroad bridge, should be “jointly owned and controlled”119 by the non-proprietary
companies and access ensured to all owners under “just and reasonable terms.”120 The
court added that access should be guaranteed on the basis of “[non-]arbitrary charges”
121
subject to review by the Interstate Commerce Commission (now replaced by the
Surface Transportation Board.)
Since Terminal Railroad, the essential facilities doctrine has been used by several
circuit courts.122 The Ninth Circuit further interpreted “essential” as meaning that
exclusion can “eliminate” competition.123 Other courts have preferred restricting the
definition, stating that facilities are not “essential” where equivalent facilities exist,124 that
no access should be granted where sharing is “impractical,”125 or where there is
legitimate justification to refuse it.126
As a matter of fact, the US Supreme Court never formerly acknowledged this doctrine. It
has even refused to use it where access threatens innovation, where compelled
negotiation creates a risk of collusion,127 or where it would imply forcing parties to
cooperate.128
For this reason, outcomes of claims brought in US courts are quite uncertain. On the
contrary, claimants bringing a claim before a specialized administrative agency such as
112
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the Surface Transportation Board can rely on more straightforward precedents, with
precise tests and clearly established methods of calculus (see Box 7).
In addition to the fact that the judiciary process is generally lengthier and more
unpredictable than the administrative one, leaving the duty to find access solutions and
determine access tariffs to the judiciary can also be less efficient. Indeed 1) judges have
more limited knowledge than firms to determine what a “fair” price is and less
opportunities than a specialized regulator to develop specific industry expertise, and 2)
they can only intervene punctually and are not in a position to monitor long-term
compliance. To reduce regulatory risk, it is advised therefore that the courts should
defer access and pricing decisions either to the market or to the regulator.129
An independent regulator model is the unanimously accepted “best-practice” model of
regulation for its credibility, transparency and legitimacy. In addition, it has been shown
to reduce the risk of renegotiation: using a sample of about 900 Latin American and
Caribbean infrastructure contracts, Guasch, Laffont and Straub estimate that the
existence of an independent regulatory body to monitor, enforce, and modify
concession contracts reduces the expected renegotiation rate by 20–40 percent.130
Nonetheless, the regulator model is only viable where it offers guarantees of
independence. This implies not only independence from the parties at stake, i.e. both
the firms and the government, but also independence from a pro-access agenda that
will impede neutral decisions in terms of access.131 Differently, having a regulator
specialized on antitrust issues, for example, would allow to ensure both the goals of
market efficiency132 and have a more independent judgment with regards to access
disputes.
In addition, the independent regulator model only works in a context where there is no
multiple level of decision-making, which would increase regulatory risk. In Australia, for
example, critics show the complexity of the Australian regulatory model, where access
issues are determined either by courts or by administrative agencies at the federal and
state levels, by the local government, or by the national government.133 On the contrary,
having one single decision-making entity ensures more certainty in the outcome, Some
jurisdictions have preferred a structure with one specialized administrative agency, like
the STB in the United States (see Box 7). Other have preferred a hierarchical structure,
like the proposed institutional structure to regulate mining-related infrastructure
developments in Mongolia, where different specialized administrative entities are
gathered under one single body in charge of overseeing cooperation between all the
entities and issuing the final decision.134
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Sometimes the institutional setting is not suitable for the independent regulator model
and therefore transitional regulatory systems are needed.135 In this situation, it has also
been advised to refer to an international dispute settlement board whose members are
vetted by the government, infrastructure investors and infrastructure users.136
Further Research
This Policy Paper has set out preliminary findings on appropriate commercial and
regulatory models to encourage shared use in mine-related rail and port systems. In
summary, we find that an effective regime for shared use of infrastructure assets
requires both an appropriate commercial structure and well-drafted regulation. The goal
is to set up a model wherein all parties are incentivized to maximize shared use through
appropriate economic signals. Regulation can assist this process, but will be ineffective
if it seeks to force companies to act against their commercial interests.
Further research will include:
• examining more closely the operational impact of shared use, to identify
particular situations where shared use is more likely to succeed in particular
when it comes to general cargo;
• extending the research to other types of infrastructure – in particular road
transport, power, telecommunications, and waste water treatment facilities; and
• drafting model legal provisions that can be used by Governments.
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